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RECOVERY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH UNDER
THE WARSAW CONVENTION
J. Kathryn Lindauer
Recovery for injuries sustained by airline passengers on inter-
national flights is governed by the Warsaw Convention.' Article 17
allows damages for "death, wounding or any other bodily injury"
suffered on board the aircraft or in the process of embarking or dis-
embarking. The large number of hijackings in the early seventies
provoked a great deal of litigation concerning the proper interpre-
tation of "bodily injury" under Article 17, whether the term en-
compassed mental anguish, and if so, whether physical injury was
requisite to recovery.
The courts have reached conflicting conclusions. At this point,
the question has only arisen in connection with hijackings; it
would, however, be relevant in such varied situations as delayed
planes, minor accidents in which the physical injuries sustained
were inconsequential or techinical engineering problems of which
the passengers were aware.' Whether the language of Article 17 jus-
tifies a broad, rather than a literal interpretation is likely to be cen-
tral to an increasing amount of litigation.
THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention, as signed in 1929, was intended to
unify the laws which would govern recovery in international avi-
ation litigation. Although one of the major considerations of the
drafters of the Convention was to limit the liability of the then
nascent airline industry and foster its growth,' Secretary of State
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
Warsaw Convention].
'The problem of recovery for mental anguish has been the subject of litiga-
tion in other areas of public transportation. See, e.g., Denver & R. G. R.R. v.
Roller, 100 F. 738 (9th Cir. 1900) (personal injuries), Mobile & Ohio R.R. v.
Flannagan, 141 Miss. 7, 105 So. 749 (1925) (delay), Ferguson v. Missouri Pac.
Ry., - Mo. App. -, 186 S.W. 1134 (1916) (wrongful ejectment).
IL. KRiENDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW S 11.01(2) (1973).
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Hull's report to the 73rd Congress indicated that the benefit to be
obtained by the passenger in having a "more definite basis of re-
covery" and the "lessening of litigation" was a significant factor
in the United States' decision to adhere to the Convention.!
The provisions of the Warsaw Convention apply to "all inter-
national transportation of persons, baggage or goods performed
by aircraft for hire."' Article 17 of the Convention provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking.'
Article 20 enables the airline to overcome this liability by showing
that all necessary measures were taken to prevent the accident!
Article 22 limits the liability of the airline to 125,000 French
francs, approximately 8300 dollars.'
Although the Warsaw Convention was highly beneficial in es-
tablishing a set of uniform conflict of laws rules at its inception,
discontent grew in the United States as a result of the stringent
monetary limitation on recovery. This sentiment was based on the
outcome of cases such as Froman v. Pan American Airways,' in
which a famous entertainer who suffered severe physical injury in
an airplane crash was forced to terminate a highly successful ca-
reer but recovered less than 8300 dollars. Discussion of possible re-
vision of the Warsaw Convention began only six years after the Con-
vention was adopted, and at conferences in Cairo (1946), Madrid
(1951), Paris (1952), and Rio de Janeiro (1953), the United
States, Britain, and France, among other countries, argued for
higher limits on the liability of the commercial airlines."
The Hague Protocol attempted to correct the deficiencies of the
Warsaw Convention while maintaining the same basic framework.
4 S. Doc. EXEC. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). Warsaw Convention, 1929,
1934 U.S. Avi. Rep. 239, 242-43.
5Warsaw Convention, Art. 1.
6 Warsaw Convention, Art. 17.
7 Warsaw Convention, Art. 20.
8 Warsaw Convention, Art. 22.
' 284 App. Div. 935, 135 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1954), leave to appeal denied, 308
N.Y. 1050 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
1"A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW VI-88 (1973).
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Concluded in 1955, the Protocol doubled the maximum liability of
the air carrier. With the belief that even twice the former amount
was insufficient, the United States discussed the Protocol for nearly
a year, and spent another year preparing a report for the Senate on
the merits of ratification. By 1959, the report had been completed,
but the Senate took no steps to ratify the Protocol.1' In fact, by
the late fifties, the arguments in favor of ratification were weak
in light of airline growth, low accident rates, access to liability
insurance, and the rapid growth of the American airline industry
even without the protection of limited liability.' Although the
United States never ratified the Protocol, the agreement entered into
force in 1963 as to the forty-three ratifying nations." The failure
of the United States to ratify the treaty resulted in two systems of
liability: one for passengers whose route did not include a sched-
uled stop in the United States and another for passengers whose
route did include such a stop.
Its efforts to increase liability having been aborted, the United
States deposited its formal Notice of Denunciation of the Conven-
tion to the Polish government on November 15, 1965, to become
effective on May 15, 1966." Before the Denunciation's effective
date, a compromise was reached whereby the air carriers agreed to
waive the limitation of liability of Article 22 up to 75,000 dollars,
and to waive the defense of due care provided in Article 20.1" Thus
under the Montreal Agreement, airlines in international travel are
absolutely liable up to 75,000 dollars per passenger regardless of
any fault or negligence. American proponents of the Agreement
contended that recovery would be maximized and expedited in
many cases by the elimination of long and costly lawsuits. The
Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, ap-
plies when the passenger's ticket includes at least one stop in the
United States. Yet the Montreal Agreement is not a treaty; it is a
"U.S. Dep't of State Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923,
923-24 (1965).
"A. LOWENFELD, supra note 10, VI-90 et seq.
"1 For a list of countries which have ratified the Hague Protocol, see KREIND-
LER, supra note 3, § 12.02.
1' U.S. Dep't of State Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923
(1965).
1" CAB Order No. 18900 Approving Agreement, 31 FED. REG. 7302 (1966).
16 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release No. 110, 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 955, 956
(1966).
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contract among international airlines." The requisites of liability-
an accident which took place on board the aircraft or in the pro-
cess of embarking or disembarking-remain the same as they were
under the Warsaw Convention but the airline no longer has the de-
fense of due care and the liability limitation is increased over 800
percent.' The cases presently arising are governed by this system
of liability. Although the language and effect of the agreements
seem clear, the courts have encountered great difficulties in inter-
pretation.
RECENT LITIGATION
Article 17, which provides recovery for "death, wounding, or
any other bodily injury" in case of an accident, recently has been
the subject of a great deal of litigation, caused primarily by the
high incidence of hijackings in the early seventies. In the majority
of cases, passengers seeking recovery for mental anguish under
that Article, when they have been neither physically harmed nor
directly threatened by the hijacker, have been denied recovery.
In Herman v. Trans World Airlines,9 the plaintiff's plane was
hijacked to Amman, Jordan. Plaintiff sued for mental anguish and
for physical injuries, such as skin rash and weight loss, claimed to
be occasioned by the fright incurred. The lower court concluded,
in a summary judgment, that mental anguish was included in the
phrase "and other bodily injury," as the nervous system is itself a
part of the body." The appellate court reversed on the ground that
the meaning of the Convention (the official text was in French)
presented a triable issue of fact."'
Rosman v. Trans World Airlines arose out of the same hijack-
ing. In granting summary judgment, the lower court held defend-
ant liable for both physical and psychic damages. Rosman and
Herman were then consolidated for appeal to the New York Court
of Appeals.'
17Tompkins, The Aftermath of a Hijacking, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 381, 390
(1973).
' Liability under the Warsaw Convention was limited to $8,300; under the
Montreal Agreement, the liability limitation is increased to $75,000.
1" N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1972).
20 N.Y.2d at -, - N.E.2d at -, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
2"40 App. Div. 2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1972).
2"40 App. Div. 2d 963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1972).
2234 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972).
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The court of appeals was faced with several preliminary prob-
lems. It first determined that the interpretation of the treaties was
a question of law,' that the French translation need not be in-
quired into,' and that French law was not relevant in determining
the meaning of the treaty.' Turning to the merits of the case, the
court found that "bodily" connotes "palpable, conspicuous, phys-
ical injury,"' and that "wounding" was limited by the subsequent
phrase "any other bodily injury," negating the possibility that
mental wounding was included within the terms of the treaty.
Plaintiffs' argument that the phrase "any other bodily injury" should
be considered in light of the local law on recovery for psychic in-
jury was dismissed as it would abrogate the Convention's obvious
attempt at uniformity." The court concluded that recovery could
be had only for the physical results of the mental suffering (skin
rash, etc.), and for the pain and suffering ensuing from those phys-
ical discomforts. No recovery was allowed for the psychic trauma
endured by the passengers in the course of the hijacking or their
24The court based this decision on N.Y. CONSOL. LAws Rule 4511(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1954) which states that the New York courts are required to take judicial
notice of all treaties.
2 Since the parties were in complete agreement that the French phrase "mort,
de blessure, au de toutes autres lesions corperalles" was correctly translated into
English as "death, wounding, or any other bodily injury," such an inquiry was
deemed unnecessary. "Where a translation which fairly comprehends the meaning
and scope of the foreign terms is agreed upon, the court's inquiry should pro-
ceed toward determining the ordinary meaning of those terms and arriving at
a reasonable interpretation which will effectuate the treaty's purpose." 34 N.Y.2d
at 393, 314 N.E.2d at 853, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
"The court further determined that the relevant French law on recovery for
mental anguish was not binding on New York courts simply because the Con-
vention was drafted in French, 34 N.Y.2d at 395, 314 N.E.2d at 854, 358
N.Y.S.2d at 105, and that it was useless to inquire into legislative intent as the
meaning of bodily injury was never discussed at the drafting of either the Warsaw
Convention or the Montreal Agreement. 34 N.Y.2d at 395, 314 N.E.2d at 854,
358 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
27 34 N.Y.2d at 397, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
" The decision in Rosman on this point is supported by numerous authorities,
not only because of the Convention's goal of international uniformity but because
Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution declares treaties to be
the "supreme law of the land." See Garcia v. Pan Am. Airways, 269 App. Div.
287, -, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317, 321 (1945) (court held that the Warsaw Convention
took precedence, contravening the usual policy that "the right and measure of
recovery are governed by the lex loci), H. DRION, LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAw 120 (1954): "Whenever the Convention offers a
guidance, that guidance should be followed rather than that of any national law
in order to safeguard the uniformity aimed at by the convention." See also Smith
v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971).
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subsequent mental distress. Two requirements for recovery were set
forth: an "objective, identifiable injury to the body," and a casual
connection, capable of being established by physical impact, phys-
ical circumstances of the confinement, or psychic trauma."9
In Burnett v. Trans World Airlines," the court reached the same
result as that finally achieved in Rosman and Herman but used
entirely different reasoning. The first premise of the Burnett court
was that the binding meaning of the terms must be found in the
French legal meaning, furthering the quest for uniformity of in-
terpretation among nations."' Because French scholars have tradi-
tionally drawn a sharp distinction between "lesion mentalle" (men-
tal wound) and "lesion corporalle" (physical wound), the court
determined that the former referred solely to a mental injury and
the latter exclusively to physical injury. In addition, the context
of the phrase "lesion corporalle" and the "normal import""2 of that
phrase were material factors in the court's holding that mental an-
guish was not within the purview of "bodily injury."' The court
thus allowed recovery only for the mental anguish which resulted
from physical harm suffered as a result of the hijacking, but not
for the general terror and distress caused by the piracy.
The most recent case arising under Article 17 is HusserI v. Swiss
Air Transport Company.' In a carefully considered opinion, a
federal district court in New York allowed recovery for mental
anguish under Article 17. The court first determined that types of
injuries not mentioned in Articles 17, 18 and 19 should be recov-
erable in accordance with local substantive law which would apply
if there were no treaty.' The silence on the part of the drafters was
interpreted as a failure to deal with an unforeseen problem, and fill-
ing the vacuum, the court found it most appropriate to construe
the remedies available under the Convention broadly to include as
many types of injuries as possible." Realizing that the draftsmen
2934 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972).
30368 F. Supp. 1152 (N.M. 1973).
31 Id. at 1152.
111d. at 1155.
"Id. at 1157.
" 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
35 Id. at 1246.
31 Id. at 1247.
probably had entertained no intention at all regarding recovery
for mental anguish, the general intent of the Convention to pro-
vide a comprehensive source of relief for injuries sustained in inter-
national aviation should be upheld. Reading Article 17 expansive-
ly to include psychosomatic injury accomplishes this purpose, as
well as providing uniform relief."
As the Husserl court pointed out, Husserl differs from Rosman,
Herman, and Burnett only in its holding that mental anguish stand-
ing alone, is recoverable. All the courts have agreed that mental
anguish, resulting from a physical injury which was the result of
some emotional upset, is recoverable. The variance in the amount
of damages recoverable under the two theories, however, is great.
In an effort to determine which measure of recovery is more valid,
an inquiry into some basic principles of treaty construction is ne-
cessary.
THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
One of the primary aids to treaty interpretation is the course of
treaty negotiations. The legislative history of the Warsaw Conven-
tion yields little aid to its interpretation. At the time of the nego-
tiations, recovery for mental anguish was virtually unheard of as a
legal cause of action and recovery for mental anguish was not dis-
cussed at the Convention negotiations."' As Husserl points out, it is
likely that the drafters had no intention at all regarding recovery
in this area. The Legal Committee of the International Civil Avi-
ation Organization discussed recovery for mental anguish in Ma-
drid in 1941, but the result, however, was a decision not to make
any specific provision for mental injury."
One of the drafters of the Montreal Agreement feels that it does
not support a cause of action for mental anguish.' Other com-
mentators have felt that the use of the word "bodily" does not ex-
3 7 Id. at 1250-51.
31 Id. at 1249.
" Excerpts from Report of United States Delegation to Eighth Session of the
Legal Committee of ICAO held at Madrid, Spain, September, 1941, 19 J. AIR
L. & COM. 70, 79 (1952).
40 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1970, at 42, col. 1, (city ed.) where Andreas F.
Lowenfeld states, "The Montreal Agreement applies only to death wounding or
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger. Thus, mere delay or anguish will
not support a suit under the Agreement."
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clude mental anguish since mental anguish is usually accompanied
by a physical disability, such as extreme nervousness."' The lack of
any evidence of the intent of the drafters and the differing views of
legal commentators compel a resort to some general principles of
treaty interpretation.
Essentially, two lines of cases exist regarding the interpretation
of treaties. One of these holds that when the words of the treaty
are clear, no construction is necessary; 2 the second holds that when
two different constructions of a treaty are possible, the one which is
least restrictive of the rights claimed under it is preferred.' The
problem thus becomes one of whether the terms, "death, wounding
or bodily injury" are clear, making judicial construction unneces-
sary, or whether they are sufficiently ambiguous to justify interpre-
tation. In Burnett and in Rosman and Herman, the courts found
that they were clear and should be applied as commonly understood.
In Husserl, however, the court found that the terms were not unam-
biguous. In view of the amount of litigation which has ensued from
the terms, not only under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
but in other areas as well," the words are certainly not clear. This
41 Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Con-
vention, 7 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 19 (1936).
42 In S.S. Wimbledon, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 5 at 23-4, the Permanent Court
of International Justice in dealing with Article Four of the Treaty of Minorities,
stated that "having before it a clause which leaves little to be desired in the
way of clearness, it is bound to apply this clause as it stands." See also United
States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494 (1900); Hidalgo Water Control and
Imp. Dist. #7 v. Hedrick, 226 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983
(1956); Savelis v. Vladeros, 137 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Va. 1955), aff'd, 248 F.2d
729 (4th Cir. 1957); Watson v. Holy, 59 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); King
Features Syndicate v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 43 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Tex. 1942),
aff'd, 133 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1943).
43Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 483-87 (1880). See also Todak v.
Union States Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123
(1928); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); Geofray v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271
(1890); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830).
" Particularly in the insurance field, there has been a plethora of cases dealing
with interpreting the term bodily injury. See Chase v. Business Men's Assurance
Co. of America, 41 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1931); United Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Shrigley, 26 F. Supp. 625 (W. D. Ark. 1939); Pope v. Business Men's Assurance
Co. of America, 131 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939); Jacobson v. Mutual Bene-
ficial Health & Accident Ass'n, 69 N.D. 632, 289 N.W. 591 (1940); Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 79 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. App. 1934); Pan
Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 340 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1960).
being so, the view taken in Husserl that judicial construction of the
terms is permissible appears to be the better view.
Further support for the Husserl analysis is found in the frequent
recognition by courts that an unduly strict interpretation of a treaty
will cause great injustice when applied to changing conditions. As
one scholar has summarized, "[I]nterpretation is ever necessary
because of the inherent imperfections of human language as well
as of the inevitable working of time and circumstances." Inquiry
into the change which has taken place in the common law status of
recovery for mental anguish and in the aviation industry is helpful
to a determination of whether "time and circumstances" justify a
broader reading of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
COMMON LAW RECOVERY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH
Since the drafting of the Warsaw Convention, the common law
has taken tremendous strides toward allowing recovery for mental
anguish. Today, American courts recognize emotional stress as a
recoverable element of damage in several situations, whereas it
was non-existent as an element of tort recovery in 1929. Although
no precise definition of mental anguish has been formulated, it
has been held to include, among other things, embarrassment,
anxiety, stress, grief, and fright." Plaintiffs have recovered for
fright at the time of the accident, reasonable fear as to the possi-
ble effects of the injury upon their health or ability to make a liv-
ing, and fear of death or insanity as a consequence of the injury."
Recovery is allowed when mental distress is (i) intentionally in-
flicted, (ii) concurrent with another tort, or (iii) accompanied by
physical harm. The intentional infliction of mental distress was rec-
ognized as a valid cause of action as early as 1939.' It is normally
limited to cases in which the flagrant character of the defendant's
action insures that emotional distress was actually suffered."9 Phys-
'5I. Yu, THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 76 (1968).
" Comment, Mental Distress in Psychological Research, 21 BAYLOR L. REV.
520, 522 (1969).
4 7C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON DAMAGES § 88, at 316 (1935).
Prosser, Intentional Infliction o1 Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH.
L. REv. 879 (1937).
49W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971).
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ical harm is not necessarily requisite,"0 but is naturally helpful to
plaintiff's cause of action.
Recovery for mental anguish in the second category has been
termed "parasitic damages," i.e., an "element of harm to be con-
sidered in assessing the recoverable damage, which cannot be taken
into account in determining the primary question of liability." 1
Consonant with the trend to allow recovery for mental distress,
courts often strain to find the necessary collateral tort." Sometimes
recovery will be premised upon a special duty owed by defendant
to plaintiff, such as an innkeeper-guest relationship,"5 when no inde-
pendent tort can be found.
When mental distress was inflicted negligently, courts have re-
quired either impact with the plaintiff" or physical injury." Tradi-
tionally, when neither concurred, recovery was disallowed. 6 The
impact rule has been justified by its helpfulness in determining the
genuineness of the plaintiff's claim.' Today, however, the impact
rule has been overruled in almost every jurisdiction."' Moreover,
the necessary physical injury is satisfied no matter how slight the
" See Wilkins v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930) and State
Rubbish Collectors v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952). In Wilkins,
plaintiff recovered for mental distress against defendants who threatened to lynch
him if he did not leave town in ten days. In Siliznofl, plaintiff was awarded dam-
ages for mental anguish caused by defendants' threats of physical harm if he did
not join their association.51 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATION OF LEGAL LIABILITY 461 (1906).
5 2 E.g., Wiggins v. Maskins Credit Clothing Store, 137 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.S.C.
1956) (court held repeated telephone calls to be a nuisance thus allowed recovery
for emotional distress).
'
3 See 28 AM. JUR. Innkeepers S 147 (1938).
" The leading case denying recovery without impact is Victorian R. Comrs.
v. Coultas (1888 Eng.) L.R., 13 App. Cas. 222, 8 E.R.C. 405 (PO). In Spade
v. Lynn & B.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), the mere presence of an
inebriated man in a streetcar was held insufficient to permit recovery where there
was no impact between plaintiff and the man.
1 See Miller v. Baltimore, 78 Ohio 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908) (court rejected
the notion that liability should be imposed where mental injury was unaccompa-
nied by contemporaneous physical injury).
5See Connell v. Western Union, 116 Mo. 34, 22 S.W. 345 (1893).
"
TReed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903).
58Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacked Aircraft, 21 BUF-
FALO L. REv. 339, 443 (1972). The abolition of the impact rule began with
Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890), which held that where harm
was forseeable, impact vel non was immaterial. See also Dillon v. Legy, 68
Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va.
27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973).
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injury is." The rationale upon which recovery is premised when
there is physical injury is that the mental injury "attaches to the
original physical injury, and the whole may be considered in the
allowance of damages."" At least one court has now dismissed the
requirement for physical injury.e' It is as yet too early to determine
whether this is exemplary of a trend to abolish that requirement al-
together.
In each of the areas in which mental anguish is recoverable, the
common law has become increasingly permissive. Legal scholars
as well as courts are beginning to accept the view that emotions
are accompanied by definitely ascertainable physical reactions,"
and thus the distinction traditionally drawn now seems specious.
Moreover, reasons once given for denying recovery are now being
rebutted. For instance, the argument that allowance of recovery
for mental anguish would result in a flood of fictitious claims and
vexatious litigation is now seen as a poor reason for denying re-
"'In Linn v. Duquesne Borough, 204 Pa. 551, -, 54 A. 341, 346 (1903),
the court stated: "Where a claim is for mental suffering that grows out of or is
connected with a physical injury, however slight, there is some basis for deter-
mining its genuineness, and the extent to which it affects the claimant."
I°McCardle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods, 191 Mo. App. 263, 177 S.W.
1095 (1915); Accord McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S.W. 742 (1912);
Kennell v. Gershonovitz, 84 N.J. 577, 87 A. 130 (1913); Porter v. R.R., 73
N.J. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906). See also 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 175 (1938), and
Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944).
6 Battalla v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1972). See generally Sindell, The Terror Neurosis, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 41
(1966).
62 Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Con-
vention, 7 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1 (1936); PROSSER, supra note 49, § 12 (4th ed.
1971): "Medical science has recognized . . . that not only fright and shock, but
also grief, anxiety, rage and shame are, in themselves, physical injuries in the
sense that they produce well marked changes in the body and symptoms that are
readily visible to the professional eye." Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 101 (1959): " ...
[t]here seems to be little doubt, in the light of modern psychosomatic discoveries,
that emotions are accompanied and followed by definite and readily observable
physical reactions." As for the recognition of the same by courts, see Mason v.
Grey, Case No. 22544, Kootenai County Ct., Idaho, 1967: "The orderly and
normal functions of man's mind and emotions are as vital to his efficient opera-
tion as his legs, hands, eyes or ears . . . . Indeed, protection of the mind may
be of greater importance than protection of the mechanical functioning of the
body." See also Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176
N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961); Halio v. Lurie, 15 App. Div. 2d 62, 222
N.Y.S.2d 759 (1941). For a table of clinical disorders which can arise from
emotional stimulation, see Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease:
Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. RaV. 193, 217 (1944).
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covery when serious wrongs would otherwise go unredressed."
The difficulty in computing damages, once an obstacle, is viewed
today as no greater consequence in the area of mental distress
than in other areas of the law." Want of legal precedent, another
ground frequently given, should not be sufficient justification for
a complete denial of relief.
Clearly, the law has changed tremendously since the Warsaw
Convention was written. At that time, mental anguish was not re-
coverable at all. It has since been allowed where certain require-
ments have been fulfilled; today, even those requirements are be-
ginning to lose force. In view of this, a broader interpretation of
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention is justified given the con-
siderations of policy which support it.
THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Undoubtedly, one of the primary purposes of the Warsaw Con-
vention was the protection of the aviation industry. Although
this purpose would best be served by a strict construction of Article
17, several countervailing factors should be considered. In the
last forty-five years, the airlines have grown tremendously. Liability
insurance is now available to protect the airline against what would
otherwise be economic catastrophies.' By virtue of its physical
control of the airplane, the airline is best able to avert hijackings
and other accidents which might result in mental distress. "' It is
also best able to distribute the risk among all of its users."'
On the other hand, tort liability is traditionally a matter of fault
and not one of risk bearing. The ability of the airline to pay in-
jured passengers should therefore not be the only criterion. It is
also questionable whether, even in view of the vast changes in the
common law since 1929, it is advisable to subject the airlines to
6 Compare Mitchell v. Rochester, 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); with
Prosser, supra note 42 5 12.
" Harvis v. Knoxville Power Co., 175 N.C. 31, 94 S.E. 703 (1917).
5KRUENDLER, supra note 3, § 11.01(5).
"6Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972):
The airline is "the best qualified initially to develop defensive mechanisms to
avoid such incidents since it physically controls the aircraft and access to it."
07 DRION, supra note 28, at 11: "As a matter of social economics the damages
caused by such activities should be considered as general costs of the activity
concerned .. "
NOTES
strict liability for a tort which has, since its inception, required a
showing of outrageous conduct, physical harm, or other extenuating
circumstances.
In view of the conflicting policy considerations, it is of particular
interest that the Guatemala Protocol,"" the latest attempted revi-
sion of the Warsaw Convention, would allow recovery for mental
anguish. As amended, Article 17 of that Protocol reads:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the case of death or
personal injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event
which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disem-
barking ... "
Despite the fact that the Protocol has not been ratified by the ne-
cessary number of nations to make it effective, it does evidence the
conviction of the drafters that "bodily injuries" is too narrow a
realm of recovery. The requirements for ratification are strict, how-
ever,"° and it is thus unlikely that the Protocol will be ratified in
the near future. Resolution of the problem within the context of
68 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Guatemala City, March 8,
1971. International Conference on Air Law, Documents at 189, 9040-LC/167-2
[hereinafter cited as Guatemala Protocol].
19 Guatemala Protocol, Article IV amending Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention. (Italics added.)
The Guatemala Protocol made numerous other changes in the Warsaw-
Montreal scheme. Under Article 22 of the Protocol, the liability of the airlines
is to be increased to $100,000. This amount is to be increased by $2500 for five
and ten years after the Protocol's initiation into operation, pursuant to Article 42.
In exchange for the increase in liability demanded by the more developed coun-
tries, the limitation was made "unbreakable." Article 24 provides that the limit
" . . . may not be exceeded, whatever the circumstances which gave rise to the
liability" and Article 22, paragraph 1 states that the limit applies to "the aggre-
gate of the claims, however founded, in respect to damage suffered as a result
of the death or personal injury of each passenger." To compensate for this strict
limit, Article 35-A permits individual countries to establish supplemental plans
under which their citizens would be entitled to greater compensation. Under
these plans the carriers are to be relieved from further financial responsibility,
the money to come from other means, such as additional fees charged to pas-
sengers, from which a special fund would be set up.
0Article 20 of the Protocol requires that it be ratified by thirty nations, and
that those nations comprise "forty per cent of the total international scheduled
air traffic of the airlines of the member states of the International Civil Aviation
Organization in 1970." This requirement was included to avoid the situation which
ensued from the small number of states signing the Hague Protocol, resulting
in two different sets of rules operating concurrently in the governance of liability
in international air transportation.
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the Warsaw Convention as currently worded therefore will remain
important.
CONCLUSION
The competing policies behind the Warsaw Convention and
related agreements have created a most difficult problem of inter-
pretation. Uniformity of the law relating to passenger recovery and
the fostering of airline growth would be facilitated by a literal
interpretation of the terms of the Convention; aiding passenger re-
covery could best be served by a liberal construction. One should
also consider that each revision of the Warsaw Convention has
created conditions increasingly favorable to passenger recovery. The
original Convention's provision for the defense of due care was
modified by the later agreements which provided for strict liability.
The limit on passenger recovery has increased with each revision.
Whereas uniformity and airline growth may have once been pri-
mary, the trend is toward greater passenger recovery. Thus the
major policies underlying the Convention now favor a liberal inter-
pretation.
The development of the common law toward allowance of re-
covery for mental anguish is undeniable. Although it is question-
able whether a tort which has traditionally required a high showing
of proof (i.e., intent, physical injury, etc.) should be the subject
of strict liability under the Warsaw Convention, the airlines were
purposely subjected to strict liability because of difficulties in prov-
ing negligence or intent against them. Thus an examination into
the nature of the tort to determine whether strict liabiliy is war-
ranted seems unnecessary. Fault, the traditional determinant of
tort liability need not be inquired into. Moreover, airline growth
since the drafting of the Warsaw Convention and the availability of
liability insurance are further support for the imposition of strict
liability.
Certainly, the courts have been faced with a difficult problem.
The conclusion of the Husserl court that the terms are ambiguous
and are susceptible to a liberal interpretation seems most correct.
It is consonant not only with the growth of the law since the writing
of the Warsaw Convention, but also with the conflicting policies
which surround the issue.
